Iran war: 4 big questions that help clarify the future of the Middle East

The war that the U.S. and Israeli governments launched against Iran on Feb. 28, 2026, is unprecedented in its scope across the Middle East^[1]. With the Arab Gulf states under Iranian attack, and Israel targeting Iran’s militia ally Hezbollah, even experts on the Middle East like me^[2] cannot predict the war’s course and especially its likely political consequences.

Still, to better understand this complex situation, I am paying particular attention to four major questions. How these specific issues play out will shed light on how this war might end and what it will mean for Iran, the rest of the Middle East and the world.

What does the US hope to accomplish?

One leader who began the war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has been dead set for decades^[3] on crippling, and ideally toppling^[4], Iran’s Islamic Republic. Iran has a long track record^[5] of sponsoring militant threats to Israel and American Arab allies.

Yet U.S. President Donald Trump has not been clear^[6] on what the goals of this war are and has said even less^[7] about what conditions would lead the U.S. to cease hostilities.

Early signs are that Iran’s capacity to project force across the Middle East is now diminished^[8]. What amount of damage to Iran’s military might be enough for the White House to believe that its mission was accomplished? Or does Trump expect Iran’s current authoritarian, theocratic political system to be removed, and for Iranians to establish a government more favorable toward American interests?

Any clarity from Washington on the true aims of this war will help observers understand under what circumstances it can end and what future Iranian-American relations might look like.

How will the war affect Gulf states’ short-term or long-term relations with Washington?

The U.S. has long prioritized deep economic and strategic relationships^[9] with the Gulf Arab states, especially Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These relationships have grown closer^[10] under Trump’s presidency.

So far, Iranian attacks^[11] have not caused significant casualties^[12] or damage^[13] to oil or commercial infrastructure in Gulf Arab states, collectively the source of 10% of the oil^[14] used in the U.S.

Indeed, some Gulf Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates, already collaborate enough with Israel^[15] that being subjected to attacks from Iran has solidified their current alliance with it^[16] and the U.S^[17].

At the same time, Gulf Arab states value long-term political stability^[18] to preserve their status as major exporters of oil and natural gas, centers of global commerce and trade^[19] and global travel hubs^[20]. While each country has its own geopolitical priorities^[21], none wants conflicts that leave it vulnerable.

Iran’s military strategy seems designed to raise the economic and human costs^[22] for Gulf Arabs who support the U.S. and Israel.

Greater pain for citizens of the Arab Gulf could fuel leaders there to pressure Washington to stop the war. It’s also possible that Gulf leaders will rethink or rebalance^[23] their relations with the United States or Israel should the end state of the war undermine their sense of security.

Such a rethink is more likely if the war continues for weeks and creates major shocks to the global economy. Even if the war ends well for Gulf leaders, by ending concerns about Iranian regional aggression, Washington’s willingness to put Gulf states in the path of destabilizing conflict may lead them to seek less alignment with the U.S^[24].

Who will likely rule Iran?

Mojtaba Khamenei, the hard-line son of the previous supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has just been named his father’s replacement^[25]. This is a clear signal that Iran is not yet moving toward the more cooperative government that the Trump administration wants. But with the fluid state of the war and its effects in Iran, perhaps the most important question is who will ultimately govern the country. Given Iran’s large size^[26], predicting a long-term political outcome at this point makes little sense.

However, several factors do not bode well for a democratically representative government that could benefit ordinary Iranians. First, the Islamic Republic has been in power for decades, going to great lengths to prevent unified political opposition^[27]. Iranians’ recent waves of protests have not meant consensus^[28] on a future political order.

Second, Iran’s political system may still have support, including among members of the clergy and army^[29]. Third, the Trump administration may hope^[30] that Iranian ethnic minorities, such as the Kurds^[31], may attack or dislodge the remnants of the government. Yet such groups lack the level of military force to ensure success^[32].

For these reasons, the current government or a similarly authoritarian one may well remain in place^[33] after this war.