Why Indonesia’s parliament struggles to maintain independence and trust
- Written by Jefferson Ng, PhD student, Australian National University
Large demonstrations hit Jakarta over the past week[1] as angry protesters demanded the dissolution of Indonesia’s Parliament.
Under the hashtag #BubarkanDPR (“Dissolve the Parliament”), frustration spilled onto the streets, fuelled by discontent over the country’s economic direction and the perceived disconnect between lawmakers and ordinary citizens.
The spark was the revelation that each Member of Parliament (MP) receives a monthly housing allowance of Rp50 million (US$3,000) — about 10 times Jakarta’s minimum wage and 20 times the minimum wage in poorer regions[2]. On top of this, each MP also receives Rp4.2 billion ($242,000) annually in constituency expenses[3].
The anger deepened when one MP[4] reportedly dismissed critics as “dumb”, and another publicly complained[5] about traffic jams on the way to the Parliament building.
For citizens facing layoffs and higher taxes amid a government “efficiency” drive, parliament seemed tone-deaf and out of touch.
But the problem runs deeper than high salaries or insensitive remarks. The crisis of legitimacy facing the Indonesian lawmakers reflects the slow erosion of the parliament’s independence and relevance within the country’s democracy.
Why reforms fail to live up to their promise
When Suharto fell in 1998, democratic reformers sought to build a strong parliament[6] that could counterbalance presidential power. The constitutional amendments[7] that followed introduced term limits, direct presidential elections, and more robust checks and balances.
The president could no longer dissolve parliament. Its agreement was required to pass laws and budgets, and it was tasked with overseeing the executive.
For a time, it lived up to that role. As one MP told political scientist Patrick Ziegenhain in his 2008 book[9] “The president has a lot of power, and it is our job to limit it.”
Between 1999 and 2014[10], MPs frequently used their powers to scrutinise the government and speak on behalf of the public. But two institutional flaws weakened this democratic experiment.
First, reformers’ fears of continued dominance of Golkar — once Suharto’s electoral vehicle — led them to adopt proportional representation. This produced extreme multipartyism[11]: a fragmented party system in which no president commands a stable majority.
Second, parliament retained the New Order’s consensus procedure. In the parliamentary commissions, faction leaders or MPs appointed by party bosses act as proxies for party elites. Real bargaining happens[12] behind closed doors between party chairs and the president, leaving individual MPs with little voice.
The result is a parliament where members are more accountable to their party boards than to their voters. Meaningful policy debate is minimal, and MPs have little incentive to develop expertise in their committees.
As one MP bluntly told a minister lobbying for a bill[13]: “Please don’t lobby here, sir. We are all subordinates. Speak to the party chairmen first.”
Electoral costs and representation
One of the root causes of parliament’s institutional decline is that electoral campaign costs[14] have spiralled beyond the reach of most citizens.
Unsurprisingly, nearly half of the MPs elected for the 2019–2024 period came from business backgrounds or had wealthy patrons[16]. A study[17], for instance, found that in average, a legislative candidate might have spent millions of dollars to get elected during the 2024 election.
This trend has further narrowed representation. Elected MPs are widely perceived[18] as serving their financiers and party leaders rather than their constituents.
Once elected, MPs are reluctant to challenge the system. Having sunk fortunes into their campaigns, they need to stay on good terms with party elites to secure their political future.
In Indonesia’s fragmented multiparty system, where campaign costs are very high, access to ministries and state resources is critical[19] for parties to sustain themselves — often resulting in an oversized coalition supporting the ruling party[20].
Between elections, political parties scramble for access to positions[21] — ministries[22], parliamentary chairs, state-owned companies’ executives[23] — and government contracts. Government ministries also fund a variety of discretionary[24] appointments that can be filled by party members.
Conversely, a party that becomes too critical risks losing access to patronage or face direct government intervention. As such, institutional incentives are heavily stacked in favour political parties being within rather than without the system.
Loss of independence
Since the start of Indonesia’s democratic era, every Indonesian president had been a minority president, unable to secure a parliamentary majority through his own party, including Prabowo-led Gerindra Party.
In a fragmented multi-party system where the president’s party does not hold a majority, a powerful parliament can easily become obstructionist or disruptive[25].
Former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono lamented in his memoir[27] that Indonesia had effectively become “semi-parliamentary or semi-presidential,” with parties in parliament strong enough to block presidential agendas.
The response from successive presidents has been to co-opt parliament by controlling political parties from within. Yudhoyono, for example, brought the Golkar Party into his coalition[28] by backing then–Vice President Jusuf Kalla’s bid for party chairmanship.
His successor, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, followed a similar playbook[29]. Although he initially promised a “slim coalition”, he quickly expanded it after facing legislative resistance — even intervening directly in party leadership disputes to secure loyal chairs.
President Prabowo Subianto inherited Jokowi’s broad coalition and rewarded party leaders with key cabinet posts[30].
As a result, almost every major party in parliament is now part of the ruling coalition. Lawmakers answer primarily to their party chairmen — who are themselves embedded in government — making parliament a subordinate institution rather than an independent counterweight.
Institutional decline
To maintain stability in an extreme multiparty system, Indonesian presidents are compelled to build oversized coalitions — a safeguard in case one or more parties defect.
Presidential pressure, combined with the need to access state resources, makes parties reluctant to challenge the government.
In addition, the high cost of entry and Parliament’s poor public image deters many capable Indonesians from running for office.
There is also little incentive for MPs to develop strong capabilities in the policy area that they are overseeing. As a result, Parliament has become less representative and less capable over time.
This hollowing out of parliament has left it neither independent from the executive branch nor accountable to voters.
The chants of “Bubarkan DPR” carry a truth reformers cannot ignore: unless parliament is reformed to restore its independence, transparency, and representativeness, Indonesia’s democratic institutions will continue to decay.
References
- ^ hit Jakarta over the past week (www.thejakartapost.com)
- ^ 10 times Jakarta’s minimum wage and 20 times the minimum wage in poorer regions (www.thejakartapost.com)
- ^ Rp4.2 billion ($242,000) annually in constituency expenses (seknasfitra.org)
- ^ one MP (www.idntimes.com)
- ^ another publicly complained (megapolitan.kompas.com)
- ^ sought to build a strong parliament (bookshop.iseas.edu.sg)
- ^ The constitutional amendments (www.cambridge.org)
- ^ Wulandari Wulandari/Shutterstock (www.shutterstock.com)
- ^ his 2008 book (bookshop.iseas.edu.sg)
- ^ Between 1999 and 2014 (www.tempo.co)
- ^ extreme multipartyism (nasional.kompas.com)
- ^ Real bargaining happens (www.newmandala.org)
- ^ bluntly told a minister lobbying for a bill (www.youtube.com)
- ^ electoral campaign costs (fulcrum.sg)
- ^ Stagehunter.id/Shutterstock (www.shutterstock.com)
- ^ came from business backgrounds or had wealthy patrons (www.tempo.co)
- ^ study (theconversation.com)
- ^ widely perceived (www.ft.com)
- ^ access to ministries and state resources is critical (nuspress.nus.edu.sg)
- ^ an oversized coalition supporting the ruling party (theconversation.com)
- ^ access to positions (www.jstor.org)
- ^ ministries (www.ijble.com)
- ^ parliamentary chairs, state-owned companies’ executives (d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net)
- ^ fund a variety of discretionary (ejurnal.ung.ac.id)
- ^ can easily become obstructionist or disruptive (muse.jhu.edu)
- ^ Stagehunter.id/Shutterstock (www.shutterstock.com)
- ^ in his memoir (ebooks.gramedia.com)
- ^ brought the Golkar Party into his coalition (www.tandfonline.com)
- ^ followed a similar playbook (www.researchgate.net)
- ^ rewarded party leaders with key cabinet posts (www.cnnindonesia.com)
- ^ Ridho Sakti/Shutterstock (www.shutterstock.com)
Authors: Jefferson Ng, PhD student, Australian National University
