Iran’s targeting of airport, ports and hotels in reaction to US strikes has forced Gulf nations onto front lines of a war they want no part in
- Written by Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute, Rice University
Washington’s allies in the Persian Gulf have found themselves in a position they have long sought to avoid: on the front line and bearing the brunt[1] of a widening Middle East conflict[2].
Having been dragged into a war of choice by the U.S. – one which[3] many around the world[4] are calling[5] a war of aggression[6] – all six Gulf Cooperation Council nations have been struck by Iranian retaliatory attacks in response.
Military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have all been hit[7]. But the missiles and drones from Iran have been aimed at civilian infrastructure, too, including airport, ports and hotels in the opening days of U.S. and Israeli operations against Iran[8].
In scale and scope, the barrage marks a major departure from Iran’s previous response to being attacked by U.S. and Israeli airstrikes. In contrast, during a 12-day war in June 2025[9], Tehran only attacked one base in Qatar, and even then forewarned authorities in Doha[10].
Instead, what is occurring in the region is a scenario that planners in Persian Gulf capitals have long warned about[11]: a deliberate attempt by Tehran to widen conflict and hit nations it sees as allied to the West.
As an expert on Gulf dynamics[12], I see the unfurling events as undoing years of work to de-risk the region[13] and placing in jeopardy the unique selling point and business models that have underpinned the Gulf states’ global rise.
A cornered regime fighting for survival
Ever since the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks[15] by Hamas and other Palestinian militants on Israel, policymakers in the Gulf nations have sought to avoid the regionalization of conflict.
Qatar led the way in mediating between Israel and Hamas[16], while Oman has done the same[17] with the U.S. and Iran. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has maintained regular dialogue with Iran[18] to de-escalate regional tensions.
Each of the successive escalations between Israel and Iran – in April and October 2024 and then in June 2025, with the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes – brought the region closer to, without tipping over into, all-out war.
But Iran’s actions in the opening days[19] following what Washington has named “Operation Epic Fury” have signaled that the comparative restraint it showed during the 12-day war is firmly off the table.
The Islamic Republic is now a cornered regime fighting for its survival. As such, it is lashing out and seeking to spread the pain to regional neighbors. The logic in this approach is that Gulf nations could put pressure on the U.S., which may fear the cascading costs of a prolonged regional conflict.
Gulf nations are also obvious targets for Iran. With Iran lacking the capability to hit the U.S. mainland through conventional weapons, the American military bases that dot the Gulf region[20] are within the reach of Tehran’s ballistic arsenal.
Psychological impact on Gulf nations
The scale of the Iranian attacks on targets in the Gulf nations in the opening two days of the current conflict underscores the extent to which Iran’s response now differs from that of June 2025: In the first two days of the conflict, Iran had fired at least[21] 390 ballistic missiles and 830 drones at the Gulf states. By comparison, the Iranian strike[22] on the Al-Udeid air base in Qatar last year involved 14 ballistic missiles and was a one-off attack on a single target.
Air defense systems in Gulf nations have neutralized most of the incoming Iranian missiles, to date, and actual damage and casualties have been limited[23] to a handful of deaths and injuries in the dozens.
But it is the intangible and psychological impact on Gulf cities under attack that threatens to inflict profound damage on the reputation and image of cities such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha. In recent years, Gulf Cooperation Council nations have presented the Gulf as an oasis of stability[24] and havens to live and work.
This is especially the case for Dubai, which has marketed itself strongly[25] as a hub for business and tourism. But it is also applicable to other Gulf nations as well, such as Qatar, which relies heavily on a steady stream[26] of large-scale meetings and events.
Iran’s attacks on civilian infrastructure[27] and soft targets – airports in Bahrain, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait, and hotels in Bahrain and Dubai – serve to puncture this image of safe and secure Gulf capitals.
This choice of targets by Iran likely reflects a calculation that leaders in the Gulf countries would immediately feel the full impact of the war and push Washington hard to find a resolution and quick.
The subsequent targeting by Tehran on oil and gas facilities, including Ras Laffan in Qatar and Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia, serves as a further and highly consequential step. It has already triggered a forceful response from Qatar, which shot down two Iranian jets[28] on March 2.
There is concern among Gulf nations that the next step in the ladder[29] of escalation could involve targeting the desalination plants that are so vital to overcoming water scarcity in the region.
Vulnerable to escalation
As critical hubs in the global economy by virtue of their reserves of oil and gas and centrality to international shipping and aviation, the Gulf nations are uniquely vulnerable to further escalation by Iran.
Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha have invested heavily[30] in creating airlines that function as “super-connectors” capable of linking any two destinations worldwide with a stop in the Gulf. A Feb. 28 drone strike on Dubai International Airport, the world’s busiest for international travel, illustrated the impact[31] that Iran’s asymmetric responses could have on the global hub model that has come to dominate world air travel.
Already, closure of airspaces over Qatar and the UAE, as well as in Bahrain and Kuwait, has stranded tens of thousands of passengers and created the biggest disruption[32] to global travel since the COVID-19 pandemic.
In addition, cargo operations essential to local supply chains have been heavily impacted, at the same time that seaborne trade through the Strait of Hormuz has been similarly interrupted[33].
Whereas initial spikes in oil prices and insurance premiums at the start of the 12-day war last year fell away[34] as it became clear that energy infrastructure was not significantly targeted, the opposite has happened[35] this time.
Peril and uncertainty
But the short-term shock to the global economy is not what will be of primary concern to the Gulf Cooperation Council members. Not since the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent Gulf War, has the region faced so much peril[36] and uncertainty.
And that is what Iran’s leaders are banking on. The attacks across the Gulf by Tehran are not, after all, without strategy. The intent is to expand[37] the conflict, thereby significantly raising costs to the U.S. and its partners in the Gulf.
Tehran’s hope is that the economic impact will encourage Gulf leaders to press Trump for an endgame. But in attacking capitals across the region, Iran risks perhaps doing the opposite: rupturing any chance of bettering ties with rivals in the region and instead pushing them further back into Washington’s orbit after a period of drift.
References
- ^ bearing the brunt (www.nytimes.com)
- ^ widening Middle East conflict (theconversation.com)
- ^ one which (apnews.com)
- ^ many around the world (ecfr.eu)
- ^ are calling (www.theguardian.com)
- ^ a war of aggression (www.thenation.com)
- ^ have all been hit (www.aljazeera.com)
- ^ Iran (theconversation.com)
- ^ a 12-day war in June 2025 (studies.aljazeera.net)
- ^ forewarned authorities in Doha (www.reuters.com)
- ^ have long warned about (www.timesofisrael.com)
- ^ expert on Gulf dynamics (www.bakerinstitute.org)
- ^ de-risk the region (theconversation.com)
- ^ Fadel Senna/AFP via Getty Images (www.gettyimages.com)
- ^ Oct. 7, 2023, attacks (theconversation.com)
- ^ mediating between Israel and Hamas (theconversation.com)
- ^ Oman has done the same (theconversation.com)
- ^ regular dialogue with Iran (mecouncil.org)
- ^ Iran’s actions in the opening days (theconversation.com)
- ^ American military bases that dot the Gulf region (www.reuters.com)
- ^ Iran had fired at least (www.nytimes.com)
- ^ strike (thesoufancenter.org)
- ^ limited (www.aljazeera.com)
- ^ oasis of stability (agsi.org)
- ^ marketed itself strongly (www.forbes.com)
- ^ relies heavily on a steady stream (www.pwc.com)
- ^ attacks on civilian infrastructure (www.pbs.org)
- ^ shot down two Iranian jets (www.aljazeera.com)
- ^ next step in the ladder (www.aljazeera.com)
- ^ have invested heavily (www.bakerinstitute.org)
- ^ illustrated the impact (www.reuters.com)
- ^ biggest disruption (www.theguardian.com)
- ^ Strait of Hormuz has been similarly interrupted (theconversation.com)
- ^ fell away (www.cnn.com)
- ^ opposite has happened (www.nytimes.com)
- ^ faced so much peril (www.economist.com)
- ^ intent is to expand (www.nytimes.com)
Authors: Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute, Rice University
